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Abstract For over a decade, the interpretation of scalar expressions under
embedding has been a much debated issue, with proposed accounts ranging
from strictly pragmatic, on one end of the spectrum, to lexico-syntactic, on
the other. There has been some confusion as to what exactly the controversy
is about, and we argue that what is at stake is the division of labour between
pragmatic and truth-conditional mechanisms. All parties to the debate agree
that upper-bounded construals of scalar expressions are variously caused by
conversational implicatures and truth-conditional narrowing, but whereas
Griceans argue that the former mechanism is the main cause, convention-
alists point to the latter, assuming as a matter of course that the source
of truth-conditional narrowing lies in linguistic convention; on this view,
narrowing is either a lexical or a syntactic phenomenon. Since researchers’
introspective judgments tend to agree with the theories they advocate, a
number of experimental studies have recently tried to shed light on this
issue. In this paper, we review the experimental record, and argue that the
extant data favour a pragmatic account.
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Introduction
Well before “Logic and conversation” went into print (Grice 1975), Cohen
(1971) pointed out a problem with Grice’s account of conversational implica-
ture: occasionally, what would appear to be a conversational implicature is
observed in an embedded position — which is a contradiction in terms, since
conversational implicatures can only be derived on the basis of a full-blown
speech act. The debate about this issue continues until the present day, and in
recent years has homed in on the interpretation of scalar expressions under
embedding. To explain what is at stake, consider the following example:
(1) Julius believes that some of the goats are happy.
An utterance of this sentence may give rise to the inference that, according
to the speaker, Julius believes that not all the goats are happy. This inference
involves two layers of belief:
(2) BelS(BelJ(¬(all the goats are happy)))
The problem is that, if we treat this as a regular case of scalar implicature,
the outcome will be somewhat weaker:
(3) BelS(¬BelJ(all the goats are happy))
(Note that (2) entails (3), but not vice versa.) Here is how the inference in (3)
comes about. Upon hearing (1), the addressee reasons as follows:
i. Could it be the case that, for all the speaker knows, Julius believes
that all the goats are happy, i.e. BelS(BelJ(all the goats are happy))?
ii. Presumably not, for then the speaker would have said, “Julius believes
that all the goats are happy.” Hence, ¬BelS(BelJ(all the goats are
happy)).
iii. It seems reasonable to suppose that the speaker is competent with
respect to the proposition that BelJ(all the goats are happy). That is,
either BelS(BelJ(all the goats are happy)) or BelS(¬BelJ(all the goats
are happy)).
iv. If so, it follows that BelS(¬BelJ(all the goats are happy)) (= (3)).
This result is not wrong, and may be quite satisfactory in most cases, but it
falls short of capturing the inference in (2).
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This particular problem was noted by Landman (1998), who used it to
argue for a wholesale departure from the Gricean party line. Landman’s
cause was joined by Chierchia (2004), who threw in some problem cases
of his own devising, with scalar expressions occurring in the scope of dis-
junctions, factive verbs, and existential indefinites. The challenge posed by
Landman and Chierchia provoked a flurry of Gricean responses by Sauerland
(2004), van Rooij & Schulz (2004), Horn (2006, 2009), Spector (2006), Rus-
sell (2006), and Geurts (2009, 2010). This round in the debate showed that,
prima facie impressions notwithstanding, Landman’s and Chierchia’s alleged
counterexamples can be accounted for within a Gricean framework, after all.
To illustrate, in a context in which (1) is uttered, it is likely to be common
ground that either Julius believes that all the goats are happy or believes that
not all the goats are happy; or more succinctly:
(4) BelJ(all the goats are happy) ∨ BelJ(¬(all the goats are happy))
Taken together with the implicature in (3), this assumption entails (2) (van
Rooij & Schulz 2004, Russell 2006, Geurts 2009, 2010). On this analysis, Land-
man’s reading of (1) doesn’t require a local upper bound on the interpretation
of some. Rather, it follows from an ordinary quantity implicature provided
(4) is part of the common ground.
The Gricean strategy for dealing with Landman and Chierchia’s obser-
vations is to proceed case by case: while all their examples can be treated
in a principled manner (as we just illustrated for belief sentences), there
is no common cure. Put otherwise, on the Gricean account, all “embedded
implicatures” are special in some way or other; they are rare and there is no
uniform explanation for their occurrence in the scope of believe, or, and so on.
This is an important point, for the central tenet of the critics of the Gricean
programme is that upper-bounded construals of scalar expressions occur
across the board, be they embedded or not. Put otherwise, anti-Griceans see
a continuity between embedded and non-embedded contexts that Griceans
cannot accept.
Before we continue our story, there are some terminological issues to clear
out of the way. In the recent literature, “implicature” has been watered down
to a purely descriptive term. (Much to his regret, the first author has been
guilty of this deplorable practice, too.) We believe that this usage has been a
source of much confusion, and will therefore avoid it here. Implicatures are
conversational inferences, and it is pointless even to consider the possibility
that an implicature might occur in an embedded position. Instead we will
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speak of “upper-bounded construals” of scalar expressions, or UBCs for
short, whenever we wish to remain neutral on the underlying mechanisms.
A UBC may be either an implicature or a truth-conditional effect, and it is
only in the latter case that it can occur in the scope of, e.g., a conditional, a
quantifier, or negation.
1 What the debate is not about
With the first volley of problem cases cleared out of the way, the anti-Griceans
changed tack, and shifted their focus to examples like the following (all from
Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012):
(5) a. If you take salad or dessert, you pay $20; but if you take both there
is a surcharge.
b. Exactly three students did most of the exercises; the rest did them
all.
c. It is not just that you can write a reply. You must.
Oddly enough, however, advocates of the Gricean programme have been
perfectly happy to concede that these data cannot be accounted for in terms
of conversational implicature (e.g., Horn 1989, 2006, 2009, Geurts 2009, 2010,
Geurts & Pouscoulous 2009). In fact, none of the data mustered by Chierchia,
Fox & Spector (2012) in their broadside attack on Gricean pragmatics are
particularly worrisome for the defenders of that view. So what, if anything, is
the current debate about?
In the debate between Griceans and their critics, there has been an un-
fortunate misunderstanding on the part of the latter. The misunderstanding
is that, for those of us who prefer to take the Gricean approach, there is
no way to account for the data in (5). Not true. What is true is that there is
no way of explaining these data in terms of honest-to-Grice conversational
implicatures. But that just means they must be something else. It is part and
parcel of the Gricean view that there are two routes for a scalar expression to
arrive at a UBC. One is by way of a quantity implicature; the other, by way of
truth-conditional narrowing (which, as we will presently see, can be construed
in pragmatic terms, as well). So in (5c) can means “can but not must”, and the
same, mutatis mutandis, for (5a) and (5b). Crucially, such embedded UBCs
are always marked, as the examples in (5) illustrate.
Hence, according to the Gricean view, there are two mechanisms that
variously underwrite UBCs: implicature and truth-conditional narrowing. This
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is one point the critics of the Gricean programme have glossed over. Another
is that this assumption is common ground between the parties in the debate.
That’s right: there is a broad consensus that the dual-mechanism view is
correct.1 Fox (2007) is exceptionally lucid on this point, but even Chierchia,
Fox & Spector (2012), who mount a hard-nosed defence of truth-conditional
UBCs, admit in a footnote that in some cases quantity implicatures must be
appealed to (Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012: note 35). Everybody agrees, for
example, that in some contexts, an utterance of (6) will merely imply that the
speaker doesn’t know whether Barney took all the strawberries:
(6) Barney took some of the strawberries.
This inference, which is weaker than the usual BelS(¬(Barney took all the
strawberries)), cannot be explained as a case of truth-conditional narrowing
by any theory, and therefore has to be a quantity implicature, as Chierchia et
al. concede.
2 What the debate is about
Given that there is a broad consensus about the mechanisms underlying
UBCs of scalar expressions, what is the controversy about? As discussed at
length by Geurts (2010), there are two main issues. One concerns the aetiology
of truth-conditional narrowing: what is its underlying cause? This question
has given rise to a variety of answers, running a gamut of potential sources
ranging from the lexicon via syntax to pragmatics. However, thus far there has
been hardly any discussion of the relative merits of the various approaches.
Instead, the debate has focused on the second question, which concerns
the division of labour between implicature and truth-conditional narrowing.
According to the critics of the Gricean approach, truth-conditional narrowing
applies across the board, and therefore we should expect to observe UBCs
all over the place, regardless of whether scalar expressions are embedded
or not. By contrast, on the Gricean view, while scalar implicatures cannot
be embedded by their very nature, truth-conditional narrowing is a marked
option, and therefore embedded UBCs are predicted to be exceptional. As
emphasised by Ippolito (2010), this has been the main issue in the literature
1 See, e.g., Bach (1994), Recanati (2003), Horn (2006, 2009), Fox (2007), Noveck & Sperber
(2007), Geurts (2009, 2010), Ippolito (2010), Chierchia, Fox & Spector (2012).
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on so-called “embedded implicatures”, and it is what the bulk of this paper is
about.
In order to get a proper perspective on the ensuing discussion of experi-
mental evidence, which is our main concern, this section elaborates on both
issues, though it may be useful to keep in mind that our chief topic is the sec-
ond one, viz. the division of labour between implicature and truth-conditional
narrowing.
2.1 What underlies truth-conditional narrowing?
This question has been answered in three markedly distinct ways, two of
which are quite similar in spirit in that they share the presupposition that
narrowing is a linguistic phenomenon; we therefore lump them together
under the “conventionalist” label. The third view is pragmatic.
• Conventionalist
• Lexicalist
Levinson (2000), Chierchia (2004), Storto & Tanenhaus (2005)
• Grammatical
Chierchia (2006), Fox (2007), Chierchia, Fox & Spector (2012)
• Pragmatic
Horn (2006, 2009), Noveck & Sperber (2007), Geurts (2009, 2010)
Technically as well as conceptually, the lexicalist approach is the simplest,
the idea being that scalar expressions come with an upper-bounded meaning
by default: some just means “some but not all”, where the “not all” part is
cancellable. The grammatical approach to narrowing is rather more convo-
luted, and of a more recent vintage. It is based on the idea that a scalar
expression may acquire a UBC by sitting in the scope of a covert syntactic
operator whose meaning is essentially that of overt only. When in the scope
of this covert operator, some will be interpreted, in effect, as “only some”,
and thus come to exclude “all”.
The pragmatic view on truth-conditional narrowing is quite different.
It is based on the observation that, in general, the occurrent meaning of
a word does not coincide with its dictionary meaning, but is modulated
by contextual factors.2 This process may produce all sorts of meanings,
2 See, e.g., Nunberg (1978, 1979), Sag (1981), Bosch (1984), Bartsch (1987), Recanati (1986, 2004),
Geurts (2009, 2010).
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and occasionally the occurrent meaning of a word will be more specific
than its dictionary meaning. In some cases, this narrowing may proceed quite
smoothly, because world knowledge alone suffices to steer the hearer towards
a specific interpretation. In many other cases, however, narrowing must be
helped along by contrastive stress, as in the following examples from Geurts
(2010: 186):
(7) a. When he drinks, he DRINKS.
b. Julius isn’t rich: he’s RICH.
c. Cleo didn’t open her handbag: she made an incision on the side.
None of these examples can plausibly be accounted for in conventionalist
terms, for in each case, the occurrent meanings of the key expressions are
heavily dependent on the context. According to the pragmatic view, this holds
for truth-conditional narrowing across the board, including the examples
in (5), which are the mainstay of the recent conventionalist critique of the
pragmatic approach to UBCs.
Though the bandwidth of theories of narrowing is considerable, as we
have just seen, and it is important to realise that there is more than one game
in town, in the following pages we will confine our attention to the conven-
tionalist account, since this is the one advocated by critics of the Gricean
approach to scalars: as we will presently see, the key issue in the experimental
literature on embedded UBCs is whether or not truth-conditional narrowing is
a freely available option in any syntactic position, as conventionalist accounts
predict.
2.2 The division of labour between narrowing and implicature
Let’s develop the main positions on embedded UBCs a bit further by fo-
cusing on an example over which opinions are strongly divided (Geurts &
Pouscoulous 2009):
(8) All the squares are connected with some of the circles.
An utterance of (8) may give rise to the following inference:
(9) Not all the squares are connected with all of the circles.
This much is agreed upon, and it is also agreed that (8) can give rise to a
reading on which it is truth-conditionally equivalent to:
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(10) All the squares are connected with some but not all of the circles (and
therefore none of the squares are connected with all of the circles).
However, the Gricean account predicts that this reading is available only
marginally, and needs to be forced, e.g., by contrastive stress on some in (8).
By contrast, according to the conventionalist doctrine, UBCs “occur sys-
tematically and freely in arbitrarily embedded positions.”3 On this view, in
the context of a sentence like (8), some will receive a truth-conditional UBC
by default, and hence this sentence will normally be read as being equivalent
with (10).
This default is accounted for in different ways, depending in part on how
the question about the origin of UBCs is answered. If some is held to be
lexically ambiguous between “at least some” and “at least some but not all”,
it may be stipulated that the latter reading is the default, or alternatively,
it may be stipulated that UBCs are preferred under such-and-such circum-
stances, e.g., when a scalar expression doesn’t occur in a downward-entailing
environment (Landman 1998, 2000, Chierchia 2004). If, on the other hand,
a grammar-based version of conventionalism is adopted, another approach
is called for. Chierchia (2006) suggests that whenever only-insertion leaves
us with several parses to choose from, the one with the strongest meaning
is preferred, and various ways of fleshing out this idea are canvassed by
Chierchia, Fox & Spector (2012). In the case of (8) this theory, too, predicts
that (10) is the preferred reading. More generally, conventionalist theories
agree that, at least in upward-entailing environments, there is a preference
for interpreting embedded some, in effect, as “some but not all”, even if they
disagree about how the construal and the preference come about.
According to our intuitions, none of the following inferences would go
through under normal circumstances:
(11) a. All the villagers own rabbits or chickens.
6; None of them own both.
b. At least 200 of the villagers own rabbits or chickens.
6; At least 200 of them don’t own both.
3 The quote is from Chierchia, Fox & Spector (2012), who go so far as claiming that this is an
“empirical generalization”. There is an obvious tension between Chierchia et al.’s statement
that embedded UBCs occur “systematically and freely” and the fact that all the examples
they cite in its support are marked and require contrastive stress. Chierchia et al. seem to be
unaware of this tension. In fact, as noted by Sauerland (2010), Chierchia et al.’s views are
contradictory in other ways, too.
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c. Only six of the villagers own rabbits or chickens.
6; Only six of the villagers own rabbits or chickens but not both.
However, conventionalist theories generally predict that (11a) and (11b) should
hold by default, and at least some of them predict this for (11c) as well. In
(11a,b), or occurs in an upward-entailing environment, and therefore most
conventionalist theories concur that an embedded UBC of the disjunction
should be preferred; i.e. or should be read exclusively, as meaning “or but not
and”. In (11c), or occurs in a non-monotone environment (i.e., it is neither up-
ward nor downward entailing), and in such cases a bias towards an exclusive
reading of or is predicted by at least some variants of conventionalism.
In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss experimental evidence for
and against the predictions that UBCs of scalar expressions are freely avail-
able in (a) upward-entailing contexts (§§3-5) and (b) non-monotone contexts
(§6). We will see that neither prediction is borne out by the data.
 
All the squares are connected
with some of the circles.
2 true 2 false
Figure 1: Experimental item used by Geurts & Pouscoulous (2009).
3 Experimental evidence against conventionalism
The first experimental study to test the aforementioned predictions was
by Geurts & Pouscoulous (2009), who did a verification experiment with
sentences like the following:
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(12) a. All the squares are connected with some of the circles. (= (8))
b. There is more than one square that is connected with some of the
circles.
c. There are exactly two squares that are connected with some of the
circles.
Each of these sentences was paired with a picture for which the sentence’s
standard and conventionalist construals yielded conflicting truth values.
For example, when interpreted according to the conventionalist canon, the
sentence in Figure 1, i.e. (12a), fails to match the depicted situation, because
one of the squares is connected to all the circles, but the sentence is true on
its standard reading.
G & P’s findings were as univocal as they get: not a single one of their
participants’ responses agreed with conventionalist predictions. For example,
participants invariably gave a positive response in the case of (12a) (Figure 1),
and the same held, mutatis mutandis, for the other conditions, regardless of
whether they were upward entailing or merely non-downward-entailing.
These findings robustly fail to confirm what G & P call “mainstream con-
ventionalism”: a range of theories which predict that scalar expressions
preferably receive an upper-bounded construal in upward-entailing environ-
ments and perhaps in non-downward-entailing environments generally. Since
these predictions weren’t borne out by their results, G & P went on to test a
weaker version of conventionalism, which refuses to deal with the ambigui-
ties it begets, and doesn’t make any predictions about which construal is the
preferred one. According to this minimal variety of conventionalism, each of
the sentences in (12) has several readings on any given occasion, but it is for
pragmatics to decide which is the right one.4
Obviously, in its most austere form, minimal conventionalism fails to
make any predictions at all: the claim that, e.g., (13a) may or may not be read
as (13b) cannot be falsified.
(13) a. All the squares are connected with some of the circles.
b. All the squares are connected with some but not all of the circles.
4 To the best of our knowledge, nobody has as yet come forward to defend minimal conven-
tionalism. Chemla and Spector disagree, claiming as they do that this view “can be attributed
to” Chierchia (2006), Fox (2007), Magri (2009), and Chierchia, Fox & Spector (2012) (Chemla
& Spector 2011: 363; cf. Sauerland 2010). However, Chemla and Spector’s “can” can only be
read counterfactually: none of the authors they mention explicitly align themselves with the
minimalist view, and all of them at least imply that they don’t.
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In order for the theory to have at least a modicum of empirical bite, auxiliary
assumptions will have to be made. One hypothesis that naturally comes to
mind is that speakers are able to detect the readings that are characteristic
of the conventionalist approach. That is to say, even if speakers don’t prefer
to hear (13a) as synonymous with (13b), it is reasonable to expect them to
realise that the latter sentence expresses a possible construal of the former.
If this auxiliary hypothesis is adopted, minimal conventionalism predicts
that, in a situation that falsifies (13b), native speakers should judge that (13a)
is ambiguous between a true reading and a false one. This prediction was
tested in a further experiment by Geurts & Pouscoulous (2009).
For this experiment, G & P used the same materials as in the verification
study discussed above, but added a third response option: participants were
invited to choose between “true”, “false”, and “could be either”. According to
minimal conventionalism, participants should have a preference for the last
option in the upward-entailing conditions, and perhaps in non-downward-
entailing conditions generally. In order to assess whether participants can
cope with this type of task in the first place, G & P included a number of
control sentences which were genuinely ambiguous; an example is (14), which
can be read as (14a) or (14b):
(14) There are green circles and squares.
a. There are green circles and there are squares.
b. There are green circles and there are green squares.
The main finding of this study was that, whereas ambiguous controls were
recognised as such in 70% of the cases, the corresponding rate for the non-
downward-entailing sentences was 6%, while for the upward-entailing sen-
tences it was 0%. On a further 5% of the non-downward-entailing trials, partic-
ipants gave a true/false response that was consistent with a conventionalist
construal. In raw numbers, only 9 out of 88 responses were consistent with
minimal conventionalism. Moreover, all but one of these “positive” (or better:
non-negative) responses were associated with exactly two: between them,
upward-entailing all and more than one prompted a conventionalist response
on one trial only.
In short, while they were rather good at picking out undisputedly am-
biguous sentences, participants overwhelmingly failed to produce responses
consistent with a conventionalist analysis of scalar expressions, either by
classifying target sentences as ambiguous or by assigning them a truth value
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in line with a conventionalist construal. In our opinion, this is very strong
evidence against the continuity hypothesis endorsed by conventionalists:
embedded and unembedded scalars are interpreted quite differently.
4 Conventionalist objections
Geurts and Pouscoulous’s experiments have been discussed and criticised
by Clifton & Dube (2010), Ippolito (2010), Sauerland (2010), and Chemla &
Spector (2011). It would take us too far afield to consider all the issues raised
by these authors, so in the following we will confine our attention to what we
take to be the main bones of contention. To begin with, we consider Chemla &
Spector’s (2011) complaint that the pictures used in Geurts and Pouscoulous’s
experiments were “difficult to decipher”:
Consider the example depicted in Figure 1 again. The crucial bit
of information for the present purposes is that the square on
top of the picture is connected with all the circles, hereby falsi-
fying the [embedded UBC]. On purely introspective grounds, we
find this information pretty hard to extract, and participants
may either miss it or ignore it altogether. (Chemla & Spector
2011: 365)
This is a curious objection. For one thing, the pictures used by Chemla and
Spector in their own experiment (cf. Figure 4 below) were, if anything, more
complex than Geurts and Pouscoulous’s. For another, it is easily shown that
the participants in Geurts and Pouscoulous’s experiments had no problems
parsing pictures like the one in Figure 1. First, had there been problems in
this respect, they should have manifested themselves also in the filler and
control items used by Geurts and Pouscoulous. Nothing in their data suggests
that this may have been the case. Secondly, on the conventionalist view, the
preferred reading of (15a) is (15b):
(15) a. All the squares are connected with some of the circles.
b. All the squares are connected with some but not all of the circles.
It bears emphasising, perhaps, that on the view under discussion, the pre-
ferred truth conditions of the (a)-sentence are the same as those of the
(b)-sentence. Now, is (15b) true or false in the situation depicted in Figure 1?
We believe it is obviously false, but in order to verify our intuitions, we asked
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27 students the same question in a classroom setting. 25 of our informants
agreed, without any hesitation, that the sentence is false. Since none of the
participants in Geurts and Pouscoulous’s experiments judged (15a) to be false,
in the same situation, there is a stark contrast here. Apparently, pictorial
complexity was not an issue in these studies.
Another objection raised by Chemla and Spector has to do with relevance:
We speculate that another reason why the local reading might
have been particularly hard to detect in Geurts and Pous-
coulous’ task, even if it existed, is that the pictures they used
failed to make the local reading sufficiently relevant. (Chemla
& Spector 2011: 365)
We fail to see why the pictures in a verification task should be held responsi-
ble for selecting a suitable reading, but that is as it may be, for in the present
context, relevance is a red herring. In the first experiment discussed above,
Geurts and Pouscoulous tested the claim that embedded scalars receive a UBC
by default; in the second experiment, the hypothesis under consideration was
that, even if they are not preferred, embedded UBCs are sufficiently salient to
be detected under neutral conditions. In either case, relevance is quite simply
irrelevant.
The third and last objection we would like to consider takes its inspiration
from the so-called “Principle of Charity”, which was first formulated by
Wilson (1959), and popularised by Quine (1960) and Davidson (1973). In the
philosophical literature, the Charity Principle has taken on many different
forms, but for our purposes, the most relevant one is the following, which is
the hearer’s counterpart to Grice’s (1975) Quality Maxim:
(16) Principle of Charity
Try to interpret the speaker’s utterance in such a way that it is true.
One way of trying to save the conventionalist account in the face of Geurts
and Pouscoulous’s data is by arguing that something akin to the Principle of
Charity masks the unattested reading according to which (15a) conveys (17b)
rather than merely the weaker (17a):
(17) a. ∀x[Sx → ∃y[Cy ∧ Rxy]] (literal meaning)
b. ∀x[Sx → (∃y[Cy ∧Rxy]∧∃y[Cy ∧¬Rxy])] (with embedded UBC)
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(Chemla & Spector 2011: 366) suggest that “in some cases where a sentence is
ambiguous between two readings R1 and R2, where R2 asymmetrically entails
R1, naive subjects are not even aware of an ambiguity.” However, even if this
claim were true, it would not be sufficient to block the reading in (17b). If we
want to argue that the availability of the reading in (17a) suppresses (17b)
as a candidate interpretation, something like the following principle should
hold with sufficient generality:
(18) Preference for Truth
If a sentence is ambiguous between two readings R1 and R2, where R2
asymmetrically entails R1, then naive subjects will only perceive reading
R1.
“Preference for Truth” is the name Chemla and Spector use to refer to (or
rather hint at) a Charity-like principle which they don’t define. (18) is an
attempt to capture what they need. If this principle could be motivated on
independent grounds, then it might explain why sentences like (15a) don’t
seem to license embedded UBCs. However, unlike the Charity Principle, its
false friend in (18) is not plausible at all; for it is glaringly false to suppose
that, in general, stronger readings are rendered inaccessible by the avail-
ability of weaker competitors. This fact is nicely illustrated by some of the
control sentences in Geurts and Pouscoulous’s ambiguity experiment, like
(14), for example, which was recognised as ambiguous by 77% of Geurts
and Pouscoulous’s participants;5 more counterexamples are easy enough to
find.6 Furthermore, it is just as false to suppose that, in the case of scalar
expressions, UBCs are systematically suppressed by weaker readings. Chemla
and Spector themselves expressly deny that this is so, even going so far as
to suggest that “there is an overall preference for deriving [UBCs], indepen-
dently of considerations of logical strength.” (p. 366) Though this is a pretty
wild exaggeration, as the experimental record fails to support a general bias
5 Surprisingly, Chemla and Spector claim (pp. 366-367), contrary to fact, that none of Geurts and
Pouscoulous’s control sentences were ambiguous between stronger and weaker construals.
6 In his review of our paper for S&P, Larry Horn mentions the following cases in which a
stronger reading is preferred over a weaker one, or there is at least a palpable ambiguity
between the two:
• Quantifier scoping: “Everyone didn’t solve the problem.”
• Neg-raising: “I don’t think they’ll survive.”
• Lexical: “He’s drinking again.” [alcohol or liquids]
For more examples and further discussion of this theme, see Geurts (2000).
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for UBCs (see Geurts 2010 for extensive discussion), there can be no doubt
that, in unembedded contexts at least, scalar expressions give rise to UBCs
often enough, which proves that they are not systematically suppressed by
the availability of weaker readings. In short, (18) is untenable as a general
principle and yields obviously incorrect predictions for quantity implicatures,
in particular. So this turns out to be a cul-de-sac.
Sauerland (2010) suggests another way in which something similar to the
Principle of Charity might serve to reconcile conventionalism with the facts.
He appeals to a principle proposed by Meyer & Sauerland (2009), which goes
as follows:
(19) Truth Dominance
Whenever an ambiguous sentence S is true in a situation on its most
accessible reading, we must judge sentence S to be true in that situation.
(Meyer & Sauerland 2009: 140)
The accessibility rider is of course crucial. What is the “most accessible
reading” of our running example?
(20) All the squares are connected with some of the circles.
According to the particular version of conventionalism favoured by Sauerland,
the strongest interpretation of (20) involves a covert only-operator whose
focus is some; on this construal, the sentence is read, in effect, as (17b).
Sauerland hypothesises that this reading is less accessible than the literal
meaning of (20) precisely because it involves an additional (covert) operator,
and thus Truth Dominance blocks the reading in (17b).
Sauerland’s account runs into the same problems as Chemla and Spec-
tor’s. First, since in Sauerland’s version of conventionalism, regular quantity
implicatures always require more silent operators than literal meanings,
his analysis entails that quantity implicatures should be systematically sup-
pressed even in the simplest cases:
(21) Some of the nurses are snoring.
; Not all the nurses are snoring.
If this prediction were correct, the entire literature on UBCs of scalar expres-
sions would be on the wrong track. Secondly, pace Sauerland, the independent
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evidence for Truth Dominance is tenuous at best.7 On the contrary, it is clear
that, if it is not circular to begin with, then like Chemla and Spector’s Prefer-
ence for Truth, the principle proposed by Meyer and Sauerland rules out of
court all manner of ambiguities that are readily observable (see note 6).
The Principle of Charity enjoins the hearer to try and interpret the
speaker’s utterances in such a way that they are true. It is entirely plau-
sible that, in general, hearers abide by this principle, but there is nothing
in it to suggest that hearers will fail to detect an interpretation if there is
another reading that is weaker or more accessible (whatever that may mean).
The principles postulated by Chemla and Spector and Meyer and Sauerland
are ad hoc as well as false, and therefore ill-suited for explaining away the
experimental evidence presented by Geurts and Pouscoulous.
5 The conventionalist counterevidence and its problems
In the foregoing, we examined various attempts at reinterpreting Geurts
and Pouscoulous’s findings so as to bring them in line with conventionalist
predictions. These attempts were found wanting. In this section, we turn
7 Meyer & Sauerland (2009) postulate this principle in order to explain why the German
sentence in (i) can only be interpreted as (ia), while the reading in (ib) goes undetected, even
though many accounts of scope taking predict that it exists:
(i) Nur
only
Maria
Mariaacc
liebt
loves
jeder.
everybodynom
a. ∀y[y =m ↔ ∀xLxy] (only > every)
b. ∀x∀y[y =m ↔ Lxy] (every > only)
Meyer and Sauerland assume, plausibly enough, that readings which mirror surface scope are
more accessible than readings that don’t. Therefore, (ia) is the most accessible interpretation
of (i), and since (ib) is logically stronger than (ia), Truth Dominance predicts that it must be
suppressed.
But now consider the following variation on (i):
(ii) Nur
only
Maria
Mariaacc
liebt
loves
niemand.
nobodynom
Like (i), (ii) admits of one construal only, and in this case, too, it is the one that mirrors
surface scope: “Maria is the only one who is loved by nobody.” However, this reading is not
entailed by the one in which nobody takes scope over only, and therefore Truth Dominance
doesn’t explain why the latter is not detected. This is odd, for the data would seem to be
exactly parallel, and if Truth Dominance cannot explain why (ii) admits of one reading only,
why suppose that it constrains the interpretation of (i)?
9:16
Embedded scalars
to two studies which claim to provide experimental evidence in favour of a
conventionalist treatment of UBCs: one by Clifton & Dube (2010), the other
by Chemla & Spector (2011). To set the stage for the upcoming discussion, let
us briefly recap what is at issue.
As explained in §2, the debate between Gricean and non-Gricean theories
is not about the question of whether embedded UBCs exist or not; it is agreed
that they do. The real issue is whether or not there are intrinsic differences
between embedded and non-embedded occurrences of scalar expressions. In
a Gricean framework, there is a profound difference between (22a) and (22b):
while the first sentence can be interpreted, in effect, as expressing that some
but not all of the girls were sick, it cannot be thus interpreted when in the
scope of a quantifier, as in (22b), unless the speaker uses marked means to
force this interpretation, as in (22c):
(22) a. Some of the girls were sick.
b. Every morning, some of the girls were sick.
c. Every morning, some of the girls were sick.
On a conventionalist view, by contrast, there is a single mechanism that
generates UBCs in all these sentences. This is not to say that, on such a view,
we should expect to find the same rates of UBCs for each of these sentences,
but it would be most inconvenient if we observed elevated rates of UBCs
for (22a) and no embedded UBCs at all for (22b).8 Since this is exactly what
Geurts and Pouscoulous found, their data are a major embarrassment for
orthodox conventionalists.
As discussed in §1, cases like (22c) do not separate the Gricean sheep from
the conventionalist goats, since in these cases a contrastive interpretation is
forced, and the two bovid species agree that these may be instances of truth-
conditional narrowing. This is an important point, because we will argue that
in the experiments to be discussed in the following, contrast was always a key
factor. Hence, our first point will be that these experiments have no bearing
on the debate between Griceans and conventionalists. Furthermore, and this
will be our second point, for the most part these experiments fail to provide
evidence for embedded UBCs of any kind, be they marked or not. Rather,
what they show is that scalar expressions give rise to typicality effects.
8 Unless, that is, there are independent reasons for assuming that UBCs are suppressed in
certain embedded contexts. But as saw in the last section, such reasons still remain to be
found.
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5.1 The best shape (Clifton & Dube 2010)
In their experiment, Clifton & Dube (2010) used a multiple-choice task to
probe the interpretation of scalar items: instead of asking for truth-value
judgments, as in Geurts and Pouscoulous’s study, participants were presented
with four situations and invited to select the one that was best described
by a given sentence. The critical items came in two versions, one of which
is illustrated in Figure 2. In this version, participants were given a choice
between the following response options:
i. a picture that verified the literal meaning of the target sentence (with-
out an embedded UBC);
ii. a picture that verified the literal meaning of the sentence as well as an
embedded UBC;
iii. “both”;
iv. “neither”.
Please indicate which shape is best described by the sentence below:
All the squares are connected to some of the circles.
Clifton & Dube
Please indicate which shape is best described by the sentence below
All/Each of the squares are connected to some of the circles.
Version 1. Figure used where B option illustrated the strengthened
interpretation
Version 2. Figure used where neither option illustrated the strengthened
interpretation
Figure 3 Illustration of figures used in Experiment 2
the non-strengthened, ‘logical,’ interpretation. Indeed, this option was cho-
sen significantly more often than option B, t(71) = 2.13, p < .05, 95% CI of
diﬀerence: (.01, .42).
Trials on which neither design honored the strengthened interpretation
received a substantially increased number of option ‘D’ ("neither") interpreta-
tions, which are consistent with a strengthened interpretation of the scalar,
t(71) = 4.39, p < .001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence: (.10, .26). Version 2 also
produced substantially more choices of option ‘A’ than option ‘B,’ t(71) = 4.15,
p < .001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence (.11, .31), which is further reflected in a
significant increase in the probability of choosing the A figure from Version 1
to Version 2, t(71) = 5.13, p < .001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence: (.15, .34). However,
the most-frequent choice was option ‘C,’ “both," the interpretation that is
consistent with the non-strengthened interpretation (vs. option A: t(71) =
2.74, p < .01, 95% CI : (.07, .43)).
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Clifton & Dube
Please indicate hich shape is best described by the sentence belo
Al /Each of the squares are connected to so e of the circles.
Version 1. Figure used here B option il ustrated the strengthened
interpretation
Version 2. Figure used here neither option il ustrated the strengthened
interpretation
Figure 3 Il ustration of figures used in Experi ent 2
the non-strengthened, ‘logical,’ interpretation. Indeed, this option as cho-
sen significantly ore often than option B, t(71) = 2.13, p < .05, 95% CI of
diﬀerence: (.01, .42).
Trials on hich neither design honored the strengthened interpretation
received a substantial y increased nu ber of option ‘D’ ("neither") interpreta-
tions, hich are consistent ith a strengthened interpretation of the scalar,
t(71) = 4.39, p < .001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence: (.10, .26). Version 2 also
produced substantial y ore choices of option ‘A’ than option ‘B,’ t(71) = 4.15,
p < .001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence (.11, .31), hich is further reflected in a
significant increase in the probability of choosing the A figure fro Version 1
to Version 2, t(71) = 5.13, p < .001, 95% CI of the diﬀerence: (.15, .34). However,
the ost-frequent choice as option ‘C,’ “both," the interpretation that is
consistent ith the non-strengthened interpretation (vs. option A: t(71) =
2.74, p < .01, 95% CI : (.07, .43) .
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both neither
A B C D
Figure 2: Experimental item used by Clifton & Dube (2010).
The second version was similar to the first, except that neither picture verified
the embedded UBC. Instead, one picture was identical to the A-picture in
Figure 2, while in the other picture, every square was connected to every
circle.9 Hence, there were three different pictures altogether: in each case,
9 Clifton and Dube also varied the universal quantifier between all and each. Here, we only
discuss the results for all; the data for each were not significantly different.
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every square was connected to at least some of the circles, and in addition
one of the following applied:
P1: No square was connected to all circles.
P2: Some though not all squares were connected to all circles.
P3: Every square was connected to every circle.
Response options P1 P2 P3 “both” “neither”
Version 1 39 3 n.a. 57 1
Version 2 n.a. 28 6 50 17
Table 1: Percentages of choices for each option in Clifton & Dube’s (2010) experiment.
Data points claimed as evidence for embedded UBCs are shaded.
The results are shown in Table 1. In both versions of the critical trials,
the third option, “both”, was chosen in the majority of cases. In the first
version, the P1-picture (= B in Figure 2) was a good second, and the remaining
options were almost completely ignored. In the second version, the P2-
picture (= A in Figure 2) came in second, but in this version there was a
substantial minority in favour of “neither”. As indicated in Table 1, C & D
assume, without argument, that these results prove that their participants
preferred an embedded UBC in a significant number of cases. They claim
that this interpretation prevailed in 39% and 17% of the trials, respectively. If
this conclusion were justified, the experiment wouldn’t support the view that
embedded UBCs are preferred, but at least it would show that they happen.
C & D’s experimental design raises a number of issues. First, there was a
marked asymmetry between the pictorial A- and B-options, on the one hand,
and the verbal C- and D-options, on the other. This asymmetry may have
had an effect on the participants’ responses. For example, since the pictures
were more salient than the verbal options, it is possible that there was a bias
towards the A/B-options.
Secondly, it is unclear how C & D’s task had to be interpreted. Participants
were asked to “indicate which shape is best described by” the target sentence.
This phrasing suggests that one of the pictures is the best candidate. If so,
how are the verbal options to be understood? “Both” could then be construed
as “Both pictures are equally good”, which itself can mean different things,
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depending on whether it is taken to imply that both pictures are good; or it
could be construed as “Don’t know”. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for
the “neither” response.
Thirdly, C & D’s task presupposes that the target sentence has a preferred
interpretation; for if it hadn’t, it is not clear what participants should do.
Consider the trial in Figure 2 again and imagine a participant who manages
to construe the target sentence both ways and has no distinct preference for
either. How is she to decide between various options? By flipping a coin? In
sum, C & D’s experimental design was not of the cleanest, and hence their
findings are equivocal, at best.
Apart from these methodological reservations, it is quite evident that
contrast played a key role in C & D’s experiment: participants had to choose
between a limited range of options and the differences between the two
versions of critical trials show that this had a significant effect. Hence, we
could grant C & D that they found some embedded UBCs, chalk them up to
contrastive construals, and go home. We could, but we’re not going to do
that. Instead, we will argue that the most parsimonious interpretation of
C & D’s data is that they didn’t find embedded UBCs of any kind, marked or
unmarked.
One of the most striking aspects of C & D’s data is that the three pictures
they used line up along a gradient: of the three, P1 is judged to fit the target
sentence best, followed by P2, which in its turn is followed by P3. This gradient
cannot be accounted for by supposing, as C & D do, that embedded UBCs were
occasionally preferred, for though this would explain why P1 did better than
P2 and P3, it would not explain why P2 received more votes than P3. Rather,
we believe that the gradient is best explained by assuming that it is entirely
due to a typicality effect.
The proposed diagnosis predicts that if we applied C & D’s paradigm with
materials that are standardly used to demonstrate typicality effects, the
pattern of results should mirror C & D’s. In order to test this prediction, we
conducted the following experiment. We presented 26 native speakers of
Dutch with items like the one in Figure 3, which had the same layout as in
C & D’s study. In our case, the target sentence was (the Dutch equivalent of)
This is a bird, and the two pictures showed one very typical and one rather
untypical member of the class. The pattern of responses was the same as
with the corresponding items in C & D’s experiment: while “both” was chosen
73% of the time, the more typical bird came in second with 24% of the votes,
and the other two options were left to divide the remaining 3% between them.
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Please indicate which picture is best described by the sentence below:
This is a bird.
both neither
A B C D
Figure 3: Critical item used in the typicality experiment.
Now the key observation is the following. It is clear that the reason why
a substantial number of our participants voted for the robin is that it is
a more typical bird than the ostrich. However, it patently does not follow
that these participants interpreted the target sentence, This is a bird, as
meaning that the individual in question is a robin. It is a well-known fact
that typicality and class-membership are different things. An ostrich may
be an atypical bird, but it is doubtlessly a bird. Perhaps the most striking
illustration of the dissociation between typicality and class-membership is
offered by mathematical concepts like “even number”. Experimental evidence
shows that this concept, too, has typicality structure: two is the most typical
even number (Armstrong, L. R. Gleitman & H. Gleitman 1983). But clearly,
it would be nonsense to say that the preferred interpretation of (23) is that
there are two tulips in the vase:
(23) The number of tulips in the vase is even.
By parity of reasoning, there is no need to suppose that embedded UBCs
were implicated in C & D’s experiment: once we have invoked typicality to
account for the gradient pattern in their data, there is nothing left for em-
bedded UBCs to explain. Of course, it remains to be seen how the typicality
structure associated with C & D’s critical sentence can be derived in a princi-
pled way. In the next section, we will outline how this can be done, but we
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should like to emphasise that our argument doesn’t hinge on that. For, on
the one hand, we believe it is intuitively plausible that the gradient in C & D’s
data is a typicality effect, and on the other hand, our avian study proves that
we can set up an experiment with the same design as C & D’s that yields the
same pattern of responses, which is best explained in terms of typicality, and
typicality alone.
Summing up, there are two main problems with C & D’s argument. One is
that their experiment suffers from various design flaws, which undermine
the conclusions they would like to draw. The other is that their data are
better explained in terms of typicality than in terms of embedded UBCs. In
the following we will argue that the same holds for Chemla & Spector’s (2011)
study.
5.2 Degrees of truth (Chemla & Spector 2011)
In Chemla & Spector’s (2011) study, participants were presented with a rating
task. Every item displayed a picture and a sentence, and participants had to
indicate, on a continuous scale, how “true” or “appropriate” the sentence was,
as a description of the picture. The critical sentence in C & S’s experiment
was:
(24) Every letter is connected to some of its circles.
This sentence was displayed with seven different pictures, three of which
are shown in Figure 4. In each picture, a letter was connected with either all
(A), none (N), or some but not all (M) of the circles surrounding it (“M” for
“Mixed”). To illustrate, in Figure 4, P5 contains two M-cases and four A-cases,
while P6 contains four M-cases and two A-cases.
judged equally false.26 This shows that participants’ answers are
influenced by the number of items satisfying the predicate: if there
are more items satisfying P, participants rate the sentence ‘Each x P(x)#
higher (even though the sentence remains false as long as not all xs
satisfy P).
Similarly, when the literal meaning of the sentence is true, the more
strong verifiers there are, the higher the sentence is rated. In particular,
the successive differences between WEAK-2, WEAK-4 and STRONG are
all significant.27
4.4.7 An alternative interpretation: graded judgments as typicality
judgments On the face of these results, the following hypothesis
might seem plausible: the rating of each condition is driven mainly by
Figure 8 Illustrative examples of sub-conditions of the FALSE condition for the ‘some’
sentence: no letter satisfies the predicate (FALSE-0), two letters satisfy the predicate (FALSE-2),
or four letters satisfy the predicate (FALSE-4).
Figure 9 Illustrative examples of the sub-conditions of the WEAK condition for the ‘some’
sentence: two letters satisfy the strengthened predicate (WEAK-2) or four letters satisfy the
strengthened predicate (WEAK-4).
26 The Friedman rank test (testing non-parametrically the null hypothesis that all FALSE sub-
conditions are judged the same) yields a significant outcome both for ‘some’ (v2(2) ¼ 20, p < .001)
and for ‘or’ (v2(2) ¼ 17, p < .001). The relevant pairwise differences are significant (all but one at the
level p < .005).
27 Statistics for ‘some’: WEAK-2 versus WEAK-4 : W¼ 114, p < .005, WEAK-4 versus STRONG : W ¼
131, p < .001. For ‘or’: WEAK-2 versus WEAK-4 : W ¼ 112, p < .05, WEAK-4 versus STRONG : W ¼
128, p < .001.
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Representative examples of pictures corresponding to each of these
onditions are given in Fi ure 4. The entire set of pictures used to
instantiate these conditions in the experiment is described inAppendix 2.1.
4.2.2 Downward-entailing environments Both localist and globalist
theoreticians agree that the embedded SIs in downward-entailing
environments are, at best, marginal.15
For instance, when scalar items are embedded in the scope of ‘No’
as in (12) or (13), it is uncontroversial that the potential ‘local’ readings
Figure 4 Illustrative examples of the images used to illustrate the different conditions FALSE,
LITERAL, WEAK and STRONG for the test sentence (8): ‘Every letter is connected with some of
its circles’. We also reported below each image whether the literal (Lit), global (Glob) and local
(Loc) readings are true (T) or false (F).
15 An environment u is downward-entailing if it licenses inferences from supersets (e.g. ‘salmon’) to
subsets (e.g., ‘smoked salmon’): ‘u(salmon)’ entails ‘u(smoked salmon)’. This can be seen as
a generalized notion of negativity: ‘John didn’t eat salmon’ entails ‘John didn’t eat smoked salmon’.
Upward-entailingness (UEness) is the reversed notion (the inference should be in the other direction,
as in ‘John ate smoked salmon’ entails ‘John ate salmon’) and non-monotonicity describes
environments that are neither DE nor UE.
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P5 P6 P7
Figure 4: Pictures used in Chemla & Spector’s (2011) study.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Number of N-cases 6 4 2 0 0 0 0
Number of A-cases 0 0 0 6 4 2 0
Number of M-cases 0 2 4 0 2 4 6
Mean rating 0 12 24 44 63 73 99
Table 2: All pictures used in critical items in Chemla & Spector’s (2011) experiment,
with their mean ratings (%).
Table 2 gives the mean ratings for the experimental items in C & S’s study.
In their interpretation of these data, C & S focus their attention on the contrast
between the P5- and P6-conditions, on the one hand, and the P7-condition, on
the other. Since P7 was the only picture that verified the target sentence with
an embedded UBC, and its rating was significantly higher than those of the
P5- and P6-items, which verified the sentence without an embedded UBC, C & S
infer that their results support the existence of embedded UBCs. The obvious
problem with this claim is that it accounts for part of the data only: like
Clifton and Dube, C & S have a much richer data set than their experimental
hypothesis can account for.
The astute reader will already see where we’re heading, but before we
go there, let us first make a few preliminary points. For starters, C & S’s
experimental instructions were verbose and less than fully coherent. Clocking
in at well over 400 words (which would amount to about one page in this
journal), they began by announcing that participants were to decide whether
given sentences were true or false, but then this alethic dichotomy was
qualified by the claim that, occasionally, target sentences “will not be clearly
true or clearly false”, and henceforth the true/false terminology gave way
to a variety of epithets, including (more or less) “natural”, “appropriate”,
and even “true/appropriate”. (Chemla & Spector 2011: 392) In short, C & S’s
instructions defy a straightforward construal, and there is no saying whether
their participants achieved a consensual interpretation at all.
In Clifton and Dube’s study, it was hard to overlook the fact that contrasts
between pictures were instrumental in shaping response patterns. Although
at first sight, this doesn’t seem to hold for C & S’s experiment, two features of
their design led us to suspect that contrast might have played a role in this
case, too. First, participants saw every picture up to four times. Secondly,
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C & S presented their critical items in one continuous series, not bothering
to use fillers to disguise the purpose of the experiment. These two features
could have facilitated and even invited comparisons between items. If that is
what happened, how could contrastiveness have affected C & S’s results? One
possibility that suggests itself is that participants judged the key sentence
less appropriate for a given picture only if they had previously encountered a
better instance. To test this hypothesis, we compared participants’ ratings in
the P5- and P6-conditions preceding any P7-items with the same conditions
occurring after participants had seen one or more P7-items. Sure enough,
P5- and P6-items received higher ratings prior to P7, and the mean rating of
the P6-items preceding P7 was statistically indistinguishable from that of the
P7-items, both being close to 100%.
P5 P6
Trials in C & S’s experiment following P7 63 73
Trials in C & S’s experiment preceding P7 78 96
Our replication 93 100
Table 3: Mean ratings (in %) for conditions P5 and P6 in C & S’s experiment and our
partial replication.
In order to corroborate this finding, we conducted a partial replication
of C & S’s experiment, in which we left out P7 entirely, and P5 and P6 were
the only critical pictures. After three warm-up items, each participant saw
the target sentence with either P5 or P6. In this experiment, there was no
difference at all between the P5- and P6-conditions and C & S’s P7-condition
(Table 3). Therefore, what C & S present as the main effect in their data, and
the keystone in their case for embedded UBCs, is an experimental artifact;
more precisely, it is a contrast effect. First appearances notwithstanding,
C & S’s experiment is not very different from Clifton and Dube’s.
As in the case of Clifton and Dube’s, we claim that C & S’s data, too,
are best explained in terms of typicality, and that this provides us with an
explanation that obviates the need for postulating embedded UBCs. Now,
C & S admit that some of the regularities in their data may be due to typicality
effects, but they argue that, even if they are, embedded UBCs are still needed:
[If] the main factor explaining these results is the one hypothe-
sized by the “typicality interpretation”, what must the underly-
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ing metric be? More specifically, what kind of situations must
be counted as “prototypical” instances of the sentence? As far
as we can see, one should conclude that the best instances of
the sentence among our various pictures are the ones used
in the condition that receives the highest rating [i.e., P7] We
would thus be led to conclude that the best instances of the
sentence are those that make the [embedded UBC] true. But it
is hard to see how this could be so if the local reading did not
correspond to a salient reading of the sentence [. . .] So the “typ-
icality interpretation”, as far as we can see, would support our
conclusion that the [embedded UBC] exists. (Chemla & Spector
2011: 381-382)
To see why this is a non sequitur, recall from §5.1 that, even though two is
the prototypical even number, (25) does not imply in any way that there are
two tulips in the vase:
(25) The number of tulips in the vase is even.
Or in C & S’s words: there is no “salient reading” of (25) which says that
there are two tulips in the vase. Similarly, if among C & S’s pictures, P7 is
the best instance of (24), then it does not follow that this sentence has a
salient reading according to which no letter is connected to all of its circles.
So C & S’s argument is invalid.
Still, it remains to be seen how we can account for the typicality effects
associated with multiply quantified sentences in a way that fits C & S’s data.
The following analysis is developed in detail by van Tiel (to appear), so we
will confine ourselves to the key ideas, starting with a concrete example.
Imagine 11 situations (s0, . . ., s10), each of which contains 10 circles. In every
sn, n circles are black, and the remaining circles are white. How well does any
sn fit the following statements?
(26) a. Every circle is black.
b. Some of the circles are black.
In order to answer this question, van Tiel asked 30 native speakers of English
for their judgments, using a 7-point scale; Figure 5 gives the mean ratings he
obtained for all situations (which were presented graphically) and each of the
two sentences in (26).
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Figure 5: Mean ratings for (26a) ( ) and (26b) ( ) in situations consisting of ten
circles, up to ten of which were black, while the rest were white.
Clearly, both sentences induce a distinctive prototype structure on the set
{s0, . . ., s10}; that is to say, an ordering in terms of similarity to a “best case”.
Whereas for (26a), s10 is the prototype, the best instances of (26b), according
to van Tiel’s informants, are the situations in the middle region of the graph.
In addition to similarity to a prototype, speakers’ judgments are influenced
by the sentence’s truth value: situations in which a sentence is true received
significantly higher ratings than situations in which it is false. This explains
why s10 is the unique prototype for (26a): it is the only situation in which that
sentence is true.
In van Tiel’s analysis, these observations are captured as follows. Letϕ be
a quantified sentence and s a situation consisting of a number of individuals
{x0, . . ., xn}, each of which instantiate ϕ’s predicate P to a greater or lesser
degree. τP(x) and τϕ(s) are numerical values that reflect how well x and s
instantiate P and ϕ, respectively. For universal sentences, τϕ(s) could be
analysed simply as the mean of the typicality values of the individuals in the
contextual domain:
(27) τϕ(s) :=
∑
τP(xi)
|s| , where s = {x0, . . ., xn} and 0 ≤ i ≤ n
This is already a quite reasonable model of the pattern of ratings shown
in Figure 5, but we can do better. Van Tiel’s data show that bad instances
exert more influence on the mean rating of a situation than good instances:
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whereas the situation with only one white circle received a significantly lower
rating for (26a) than the prototype, there was almost no difference between
the situations with one black circle and none. This observation can modelled
by weighing the typicality values of the individual instances in such a way
that lower typicality values carry more weight than higher ones, which can
be done simply by taking the harmonic instead of the arithmetic mean:
(28) τϕ(s) := |s|∑τP(xi)−1 , where s = {x0, . . ., xn} and 0 ≤ i ≤ n
Van Tiel shows that, for a very broad range of values for its free parameters,
this analysis yields a strong correlation with the ratings he obtained for (26a)
when paired with situations consisting of black and white circles.
For existential sentences, van Tiel proposes a coarse-level analysis that ab-
stracts away from the typicality values of the individuals a situation consists
of:
(29) τϕ(s) := 1− dϕ(s)2 + vϕ(s)
Here, dϕ(s) is the distance between s and the prototype situation, which
according to van Tiel’s informants was the situation consisting of an equal
number of black and white circles. vϕ(s) is a function of ϕ’s truth value in s,
which can vary according to how strongly truth is hypothesised to influence
typicality judgements. Hence, (29) is a straightforward implementation of the
observation that τϕ(s) is determined by its similarity to the prototype and
ϕ’s truth value in s. This analysis, too, fits the observed pattern of ratings
quite well for a very broad range of values for vϕ(s).
Armed with the analyses in (28) and (29), we return to Chemla and Spec-
tor’s experiment. As discussed at the beginning of this section, C & S pre-
sented sentence (30) paired with seven pictures (P1, . . ., P7) containing six
letters (`1, . . ., `6), each of which was connected to all, none, or some but not
all of the circles surrounding it (Table 2):
(30) Every letter is connected to some of its circles. (=(24))
According to the analysis in (28), the typicality value of any picture P is a
function of the typicality values of its letters with respect to the predicate
(31) . . . is connected to some of its circles.
For each picture P with letters `1, . . ., `6, this yields:
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(32) τ(30)(P) = 6∑τ
(31)
(`i)−1
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6
The typicality analysis of existential sentences in (29) entails the following:
(33) Whenever ` is connected to none of its circles, `′ is connected to all of
its circles, and `′′ is connected to some but not all of its circles, then
τ(31)(`) < τ(31)(`′) < τ(31)(`′′).
(32) and (33) constrain, but don’t fix, the possible ratings associated with
P1, . . ., P7, and in order to determine how well these constraints capture
C & S’s data, van Tiel ran a Monte Carlo simulation, which involved generating
5,000 triplets of values satisfying the constraint in (33). For each triplet, (32)
was used to compute the predicted typicality value for each of P1, . . ., P7,
and then the means of these values were compared with the mean ratings
C & S found for these situations. The correlation was remarkably close to 1
(r = .995, p < .001). Hence, van Tiel’s typicality model fits C & S’s findings
almost perfectly, and unlike C & S’s own proposal, it accounts for the data
practically without remainder.
To sum up: C & S’s data exhibit the kind of gradient pattern that, even
by their own admission, calls for an explanation in terms of typicality. Nev-
ertheless, C & S insist that a small part of this pattern proves the existence
of embedded UBCs. We have seen that C & S’s argument cuts no ice: their
findings can be fully accounted for by a typicality model that is entirely
motivated on independent grounds, which obviates the need for embedded
UBCs.
6 Non-monotone environments
Thus far, we have confined our attention to sentences in which a scalar
expression occurs in an upward-entailing context; in this section, we turn to
non-monotone environments:
(34) There was only one key that fit some of the locks.
On some versions of the conventionalist account, (34) should “systematically
and freely” give rise to the following reading:
(35) There was only one key that fit some but not all of the locks.
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≡ One key fit some but not all of the locks, and all the others fit either
none or all of the locks.
Is this reading available in principle? Sure it is. We only have to apply con-
trastive stress to some:
(36) There was only one key that fit some of the locks.
Is this reading freely available? No: it evidently needs to be forced. That, at
any rate, is our intuition, and it was supported by Geurts and Pouscoulous’s
data. In the study reviewed in §3, they presented sentence (37) with the
pictures in Figure 6:
(37) There are exactly two circles that are connected with some of the
squares.
Whereas the picture on the left makes the sentence true on the critical
reading, the picture on the right makes it false. Geurts and Pouscoulous’s
first experiment robustly failed to corroborate conventionalist predictions:
participants’ truth-value judgments contradicted the predicted reading on
every single trial. In their ambiguity study, Geurts and Pouscoulous found
 
 
Figure 6: Pictures used by Geurts and Pouscoulous with sentence (37). Note that, with
an embedded UBC for some, the picture on the left verifies this sentence, while the
picture on the right falsifies it.
a modicum of support for conventionalists of the minimalist persuasion
(cf. §3), but the evidence was quite weak: in this experiment, participants
detected an ambiguity on 11% of the trials, which is better than nothing, but
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uncomfortably close to nothing when compared to the 70% rate at which
bona fide ambiguities were detected in control items.
As one might expect, Chemla and Spector claim that their participants
did much better. Figure 7 shows two of the critical pictures in C & S’s second
experiment; the target sentence was the French equivalent of:
(38) There is exactly one letter connected with some of its circles.
C & S report that, in the critical condition, in which (38) was paired with the
B-picture in Figure 7, the sentence received an average rating of 73%, which
causes them to leap to the conclusion that there may be a general preference
for deriving UBCs, be they embedded or not (Chemla & Spector 2011: 387).
5.4 Predictions
In non-monotonic contexts, localist theories predict that the local reading
exists, while globalist theories cannot derive this reading.Moreover, in the
LOCAL condition, the local reading is true, while all the readings predicted
by globalist theories are false.Hence, in the LOCAL condition (see Figure 11
for an example), globalist theories predict that the sentence is plainly false,
while localist theories predict that the sentence has a true reading.
5.5. Results and interpretation
5.5.1 Preliminary technical remarks We lost 15% of the responses in
target conditions for technical reasons (see footnote 18). See section
4.4.1 for more details about the reported statistical analyses.
5.5.2 Main result: the local reading exists Figure 12 reports the mean
ratings of the target items grouped according to which interpretation is
true: none, local only, literal only, all. All pairwise differences are
significant, except for the LOCAL vs. LITERAL conditions in the case of
‘or’.33 (The relevant Wilcoxon tests for ‘some’: FALSE vs. LITERAL:
W ¼ 126, p < .005, LITERAL versus LOCAL: W ¼ 109, p < .05, LOCAL
Figure 11 Illustrative examples of the images used to illustrate the different conditions FALSE,
LITERAL, LOCAL and ALL for the test sentence (21): ’Exactly one letter is connected with some
of its circles’. We also reported below each image whether the literal (Lit), global (Glob) and
local (Loc) readings are true (T) or false (F).
33 On a per item analysis, this difference does come out significant : U ¼ 32 (n1 ¼ 4, n2 ¼ 8), p <
.005.
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Figure 7: Pictures used by Chemla and Spector with sentence (38). Note that, with
an embedded UBC for some, the picture on the left falsifies this sentence, while the
picture on the right verifies it.
Apart from the fact that this conclusion would be prema ure even if C & S’s
videnc was ound, it is doub ful that the evidence they pr sent is sound. To
begin with, the same worries we voiced about C & S’s first experiment apply in
this case, too: the instructions were the same, hence susceptible to the same
criticism (cf. §5.2), and as in the first experiment, the target sentence was
shown over and over again to a small number of participants (n = 16), with
no fillers betwe n critical items. In short, it’s almost as if C & S’s experiment
was design d to c use inte actions between i ems. We have seen that this is
what happened in their first experiment, and we will see that it happened in
their second experiment, too.
In addition to potential contrast effects between items, it is evident that
there was a salient contrast within the B-picture in Figure 7, too, and it is
not hard to se how this might explain the high rating C & S obtained for
this particular item. Given that, in this picture, there is a striking visual
contrast between the leftmost letter and the other two, and give hat the
pr dicate of (38) is unequivocally verified by the left-most letter, informants
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were invited to interpret that letter as the one the author of (38) had in mind,
and construe the predicate accordingly; that is, interpret it in such a way that
it was falsified by the remaining letters.10 Put otherwise, we maintain that the
visual contrast in the B-picture provoked a contrastive interpretation of the
predicate of the target sentence. If this is correct, C & S’s data have no bearing
on the debate between Gricean and conventionalist theories of embedded
UBCs.
In a sense, C & S seem to agree with this assessment. Recall from §4 that
C & S complained that Geurts and Pouscoulous’s pictures were “difficult to
decipher” (p. 365), and one of the virtues they claim for their own materials is
that they are better in this respect. Now compare C & S’s pictures in Figure 7
with Geurts and Pouscoulous’s pictures in Figure 6. If C & S’s claim is that
the latter are more complex than the former, then it is debatable at best.
However, if C & S’s claim is that their pictures forced the reading they were
after, while Geurts and Pouscoulous’s didn’t, then we fully agree. But in that
case there is no issue.
Our diagnosis of C & S’s main finding is that it is driven by a salient visual
contrast in the B-picture in Figure 7. This assumption entails that if the
contrast is reduced, the picture’s rating should follow suit. In order to test
that prediction, we conducted an experiment with materials that were nearly
identical to C & S’s (Table 4), but in which high-contrast and low-contrast
critical items were presented to different groups of participants. The crucial
difference between the high-contrast and low-contrast pictures was that in
the former but not the latter, there was a stark visual contrast between one
letter, which unequivocally verified the predicate of the target sentence in
(39), and the remaining letters.
(39) Exactly one letter is connected to some of its circles.
Questionnaires for 54 participants were posted on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. All participants saw the same experimental items, with one exception
only: whereas for half of the participants (Group A), sentence (39) was paired
with the low-contrast picture (LoCon) in Table 4, for the other half (Group B),
the same sentence was presented with the high-contrast picture (HiCon), i.e.
C & S’s B-picture. The remaining three items were the same for both groups;
10 Here we assume, with C & S, that hearers adopt the Principle of Charity by default. That is to
say, we accept the original Principle of Charity (16), which we consider to be plausible, in
contrast to C & S’s Preference for Truth (18), which is much stronger, and not plausible at all
(see §4).
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True plain true
False plain false
Literal false with an embedded UBC
HiCon
true with an embedded UBC
high contrast
LoCon
true with an embedded UBC
low contrast
Table 4: Experimental items used in the in the high/low contrast study.
they featured pictures in which the target sentence was either unequivocally
false (False), unequivocally true (True), or only literally true, i.e. false with an
embedded UBC for some (Literal). The order of presentation was randomised
across 9 lists. As in C & S’s experiment, we didn’t include any fillers in our
experiment, so there were four items in both conditions. In comparison to
C & S’s instructions, ours were short and sweet: participants were simply
asked to indicate, on a 7-point scale, how well each of the pictures was
described by sentence (39).
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because they weren’t
native speakers of English. The average ratings produced by the remaining
participants are given in Table 5. As expected, the results for the high-
contrast condition (Group B) mirror C & S’s. Participants considered (39) the
best description of the True picture, followed by the HiCon, Literal, and
False pictures (in that order). Most importantly, the difference between the
HiCon and False items was statistically significant (t(25) = 4.035, p < .001).
In the low-contrast condition (Group A), on the other hand, the ratings for the
LoCon and False items were not significantly different (t(24) = 1.252, p =
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Group A Group B
True 84 80
False 30 32
Literal 74 49
HiCon – 64
LoCon 37 –
Table 5: Average ratings (in %) in the high/low contrast experiment.
.22). Hence our prediction was confirmed: it appears that the high rating for
the HiCon item (= C & S’s B-item) was due to a visual contrast within that
picture.11
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the experimental record
offers no support to the claim that scalar items freely license upper-bounded
construals in non-monotone environments. In the last section, we argued
that the same holds for upward-entailing environments. Hence, we conclude
that, as things currently stand, there is no experimental evidence in favour
of the view that scalar expressions freely give rise to embedded UBCs.
Conclusion
It is widely agreed that there are two mechanisms that variously underwrite
UBCs of scalar expressions: conversational implicature and truth-conditional
narrowing. The main bone of contention in the debate on so-called “embedded
implicatures” concerns the division of labour between these two mechanisms.
More precisely, it is about the availability of truth-conditional narrowing.
On the conventionalist view, narrowing is freely available, and therefore we
11 Interestingly, C & S also tested both HiCon and LoCon pictures in their experiment, but failed
to find a difference between them: both received a comparatively high rating of 73%. A likely
explanation for the discrepancy between C & S’s results and ours is that, once participants
had encountered a HiCon item, the UBC triggered by this item had knock-on effects on
subsequent items. This would also explain why, in our experiment, the difference between
the Literal and True items was significant for Group B (t(25) = 4.1, p < .001), but only
marginally so for Group A (t(24) = 1.959, p = .062). In C & S’s study, such effects may have
been reinforced by the extreme repetitiveness of the experiment, in which every item was
presented four times, which is to say that each participant saw the critical sentence no less
than 52 times.
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should expect to regularly observe its effect in embedded positions, too. On
the Gricean view, narrowing requires special circumstances, like contrastive
stress for example, and therefore embedded UBCs should be the exception
rather than the rule.
This issue cannot be decided on the basis of introspective evidence, since
introspection can only tell us if a given expression can be interpreted in such-
or-such a way, and there is a consensus that, e.g., (40a) can be interpreted as
(40b):
(40) a. All the squares are connected with some of the circles.
b. All the squares are connected with some but not all of the circles.
The key question is whether such readings are readily available, and we
can only hope to answer that question by collecting experimental data.
Obviously, experiments should be designed in such a way that they don’t
bias participants towards the contested reading, for again, it is agreed that
embedded UBCs are possible: what needs to be established is whether or not
they “occur systematically and freely in arbitrarily embedded positions”, as
Chierchia, Fox & Spector (2012) put it.
A recurrent flaw in the experimental studies that have been claimed to
support the conventionalist position is that they did bias participants towards
the desired response. This was done (unwittingly, of course) by means of
contrasts between or within items, the effect of which was reinforced, in
Chemla and Spector’s study, by the way materials were presented. As a
result, the experimental findings reported by Clifton and Dube and Chemla
and Spector fail to prove their point. Fortunately, however, their data are
still of great interest, since they show that embedded scalars may give rise
to typicality effects. This is an important result, and the fact that it was
serendipitous doesn’t diminish its importance.
To return to our main topic, we conclude that as far as the experimental
evidence is concerned, the state of the art is where Geurts and Pouscoulous
(2009) left it, which is to say that the data speak unequivocally against
conventionalism and in favour of a Gricean view on scalar expressions.
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